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SIXTH AMENDMENT JUROR RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENT REVITALIZED:
PEOPLE v. JONES
Leon Jones was convicted by a jury of selling marijuana to a
police undercover agent and sentenced to a term of from five years
to life in the California state penitentiary.' On appeal he contended
that the state had violated his sixth amendment rights by excluding
from the jury all residents of the heavily black Los Angeles County
neighborhood where he lived and where the illicit sale took place.
In People v. Jones,2 the California Supreme Court agreed and held
that a criminal defendant in a state prosecution has a constitutional
right to be tried by a jury drawn from an area that encompasses the
scene of the crime.
Prior to Jones' arrest and trial, Los Angeles County had been
divided into several judicial districts. Each district has its own court-
house and draws jurors only from within its geographical boundaries.
Jones' neighborhood, the 77th Los Angeles Police Precinct, lies on
the boundary between the Central and Southwest Districts, and is part
of the Central District. Normally, cases arising there are tried down-
town in the central courthouse with jurors drawn from the entire Cen-
tral District, including the 77th Precinct. In 1970, well before Jones'
arrest, the presiding judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court ordered
that all crimes committed in the 77th Precinct be tried in the Southwest
District courthouse to alleviate crowding downtown. As a result,
Jones' jury was drawn only from the suburban Southwest District,
which did not include the site of the crime in the 77th Precinct.
The 77th Precinct is 73 percent Negro. The Central District,
including the 77th Precinct, is 31 percent Negro. The Southwest Dis-
trict is 7 percent Negro. Thus the practical effect of the 1970 order
was to try defendants from a heavily black central-city area8 before
1. Pursuant to CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 11531 (West 1968). See opinion
of the Court of Appeals, People v. Jones, 27 Cal. App. 3d 98, 103 Cal. Rptr. 475
(2d Dist. 1972).
2. 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
3. Actually, under the 1970 order, as under most of the statutes and precedents
discussed herein, the critical parameter in determining the area from which jurors are
to be selected, is the place where the crime was committed, and not the place where
the defendant resides. In most cases these two locales will be sufficiently similar that
no problem is raised by treating them interchangeably. However, in the rare in-
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suburban juries with significantly fewer black faces than would appear
downtown. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court chose to mini-
mize, at least explicitly, the racial implications of the situation, and
based its decision in the Jones case solely on the vicinage provision
of the sixth amendment, which guarantees to criminal defendants the
right to be tried by a jury "of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed."4
Although not every feature of the common law jury was pre-
served in the sixth amendment, 5 a modified vicinage requirement
clearly did survive, since it is embodied in the language of the amend-
ment itself." The basic sixth amendment right to jury trial was secured
against infringement by the states in Duncan v. Louisiana,7 and the
Jones court therefore reasoned that, after Duncan, the vicinage provi-
sion is also enforceable against the states through the fourteenth
amendment.8  While conceding that a state may draw its districts as
large or small as it wishes, 9 the court found it a near absolute'0 com-
mand of the sixth amendment that a defendant be afforded a jury
drawn from the whole of the district where the crime he is charged
with was committed." For Jones, that would have been the Central
District of Los Angeles County. Since he was tried by a jury drawn
from the Southwest District, his conviction had to be reversed.'
2
stance where a defendant is charged with a crime that was committed far away from
his home, the Jones holding might produce unexpected consequences. See text accom-
panying note 65 infra.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The California Constitution contains no explicit
juror-residence requirement; and its basic jury trial provision, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7,
has been construed to require only that jurors be drawn from within the county fixed
by law as the place of trial. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 32
P.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1934).
5. Features that did not survive include the requirement that there be twelve
jurors, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970), and the requirement that the
verdict be unanimous, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). See also text accom-
panying notes 26 and 27 infra.
6. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The relevant language is quoted in text accom-
panying note 4 supra.
7. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Prior to Duncan, the states could, consistently with the
federal Constitution, try defendants in any manner that insured fundamental fairness.
See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
8. 9 Cal. 3d at , 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349. This conclusion is,
however, open to question. See notes 26-35 infra and accompanying text.
9. Id. at-, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
10. "We do not say that there may not be an exceptional case where inconveni-
ence and cost could constitute sufficiently compelling reasons" to "justify the exclusion
from the jury panel of residents in the district where the crime was committed."
Id. at , 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
11. Id. at ., 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
12. As it was necessary for the defendant to be retried, the court went on to con-
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Although the Constitution as originally drafted restricted the
venue, or place of trial, of criminal cases, it contained no similar limi-
tation on vicinage, the area from which the jury could be drawn. It
was in part this omission which produced the impetus for drafting
the sixth amendment. 13  As originally introduced in the House, the
amendment would merely have codified the common law attributes
of the jury, including the traditional vicinage requirement. 14  The Sen-
ate, however, was opposed to any vicinage provision, partly because
the subject was already covered in the pending judiciary bill,"; and
partly because the Federalists feared that limiting the area of vicinage
to the county, as at common law, would hinder the exercise of judicial
power by the national government.' 6 The compromise which became
the sixth amendment retained the concept of common law vicinage
but left to Congress the power to fix the size of the districts from
which jurors could be drawn in federal court cases. Congress exer-
cised this power in the Judiciary Act of 1789,'7 which was passed
contemporaneously with the sixth amendment.' 8 Under the Act, state
and district boundaries generally coincided.' 9
Significantly, section 29 of the Act provided that
jurors ... shall be returned as there shall be occasion for them, from
such parts of the district from time to time as the court shall direct, so
as shall be most favourable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur
an unnecessary expense, or unduly to burthen the citizens of any part
of the district with such services.20
sider the propriety of the jury instruction that had been given regarding defendant's
alibi, concluding that it was erroneous. Id. at , 510 P.2d at 713, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 353. This part of the opinion will not be discussed, since it is clear that the
court's decision of the case was based instead on the vicinage requirement of the sixth
amendment.
13. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970).
14. 'The trial of all crimes ...shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of
the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge,
and other accustomed requisites. . . ." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
15. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 95 (1970). This bill ultimately became
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
16. F. HELLER, THE SIX AMENDMENT 92-101 (1951). Professor Heller, the
leading authority on the history of the sixth amendment, fails to elucidate exactly how
a strict vicinage requirement would have hindered the federal judiciary. The point
is, of course, that the Federalists believed such a limitation unwise and acted accord-
ingly.
17. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
18. See generally Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 78-81 (D. Md. 1969);
F. HELLER, supra note 16, at 92-101.
19. Maryland and Virginia were each divided into two districts. Subsequently,
other states were divided, and today many states contain more than one federal judicial
district. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1971).
20. Ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 88 (1789).
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Since the same Congress that adopted this language also passed the
sixth amendment, it is clear that the amendment's vicinage provision
was meant only to prescribe the maximum area from which jurors
could be drawn, not to mandate that jurors be drawn from every part
of a district; and the courts have so held.21 When Congress later subdi-
vided some districts into divisions,22 the courts reiterated that there
is no constitutional right to a jury selected from any particular division,23
and, more specifically, no right to a jury selected from the division in
which the crime occurred.24 The only right a defendant can claim is that
each and every member of his jury be a resident of the district
where the crime was committed; and Congress can define "district"
as it wishes, with the proviso that if a district should encompass more
than one state, the state boundary would then control for vicinage
purposes.25
Of course the sixth amendment was not initially intended to apply
to the states. Although the right to a jury with all the "essential
features" was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due proc-
ess clause and thus made applicable to the states in the Duncan case,2'
the requirement that there be twelve jurors and the requirement that
there be a unanimous verdict have been deemed non-essential by the
Supreme Court.2 7  While a vicinage restriction, unlike the common
law requirements of twelve jurors and a unanimous verdict, was
clearly preserved in the sixth amendment" and is therefore fully appli-
cable to the federal government, the Supreme Court has yet to
21. See, e.g., United States v. Peuschel, 116 F. 642 (S.D. Cal. 1902); United
States v. Ayres, 46 F. 651 (D.S.D. 1891); United States v. Wan Lee, 44 F. 707
(D. Wash. 1890); cf. Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218 (1898). See generally
Blume, The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue,
43 MicH. L. REv. 59 (1944); Connor, The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of
the Vicinage, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1909).
22. See, e.g., Acts of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 100, 36 Stat. 1121 (subdividing Ohio
districts).
23. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1917); United States v. Titus,
210 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948); see United States v. Brown, 281 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. La.
1968).
24. United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972); Larramore v. United
States, 8 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 586 (1926); cf. State v.
Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1971).
25. This is the necessary implication of the sixth amendment's text, since jurors
must be drawn from the district and state in which the crime was committed.
26. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (twelve jurors); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (unanimity).
28. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
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rule on whether it is an "essential feature" of a jury trial and thus
one to be applied to the states under the incorporation theory.20 Sev-
eral other guaranties preserved in the Bill of Rights have so far es-
caped incorporation."0 Vicinage is an especially poor candidate
for incorporation because, as preserved in the sixth amendment, it
is incapable of meaningful application in the state context. Incorpo-
rated provisions are usually applied to the states with the full regalia
of their federal interpretations,31 and since under the Judiciary Act
of 1789 Congress was given the power to fix the size of districts, 2
a "district" could presumably be as large as the state legislature wanted
to make it, and could even coincide with the borders of the state,
so long as it was "previously ascertained by law. ' 33  Moreover, since
under section 29 of the Judiciary Act jurors could be summoned from
any part of the district 34 (as opposed to being evenly drawn from
the entire district), a straightforward application of the sixth amend-
ment's vicinage provision as defined by federal standards would afford
no protection that the state legislature could not easily circumvent by
drawing one statewide "district" and calling the real functional units
of the state judiciary by some other name.;
Apparently the California Supreme Court viewed with incredulity
such an interpretation of the vicinage provision, under which a major
constitutional question could turn on the California legislature's
characterization of the administrative units of Los Angeles County
courts as "districts" instead of, for example, "divisions." Rather than
face the harsh conclusion that any newly established right to a jury
29. Under the incorporation theory, the Supreme Court looks to specific provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights to give meaning to the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. Provisions which are considered fundamental are made applicable to the states
as essentials of due process. See concurring and dissenting opinions in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) and cases cited therein.
30. Examples are the fifth amendment right to indictment by a grand jury, the
right to jury trial in civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars, and the entire second and third amendments.
31. "Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental
to the American scheme . . . of justice' the same constitutional standards apply against
both the State and Federal governments." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795
(1969) (citations omitted).
32. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
33. The sixth amendment text explicitly requires that the district from which
jurors are to be selected have been previously ascertained by law.
34. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
35. The constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has been consistently
sustained by the courts, inasmuch as the Act and the sixth amendment were both
adopted by the same Congress without apparent conflict. See cases cited in note 21
supra. See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
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of the vicinage for state defendants could be so easily circumvented,
the court chose to wrench the language of the sixth amendment away
from its history, and from federal precedent, to read an additional
requirement into the vicinage provision: juries must be drawn from
the whole of a district, and not just from a convenient part thereof.5 6
Admittedly this interpretation helps to save what may be a valuable
right from the linguistic caprice of legislators: no matter how large
the district is drawn, jurors must be selected uniformly from its entire
populace, necessarily including the community where the crime was
committed. A criminal defendant thus has some assurance that signifi-
cant elements of this community will be represented on his jury panel,
even though this representation can be diluted by legislative enlarge-
ment of district boundaries. To understand why a respected court
should base such an intuitively defensible result on such an historically
dubious theory, it is necessary to consider, and ultimately to discard, an
alternative basis for the holding in Jones, rooted in the line of cases
characterizing a properly impartial jury.
In 1879 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Negro
defendant was denied the equal protection of the laws when he was
tried by a jury from which all Negroes had been systematically ex-
cluded pursuant to a state statute.37  Later the Court broadened its
holding to cover cases of administrative discrimination.38  Although
there is no right to have Negroes on any particular jury,39 a long-
standing and substantial discrepancy between the proportion of Ne-
groes on a county's jury panels and proportion of Negroes in the com-
munity will give rise to an inference of discrimination, which the state
may rebut with a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy.40 The
36. 9 Cal. 3d at _, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
37. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
38. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (for thirty years clerks had failed to
select any Negroes for jury service although some had necessary qualifications);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (jury commissioners did not know any qualified
Negroes to call); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (jury commissioners found
all Negroes to be unqualified).
39. Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316
(1906); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
40. [Plurposeful discrimination exists whenever significant unexplained dispari-
ties exist. In other words, it is not the significant disparities themselves which
are unconstitutional, . . . they only raise the inference of discrimination.
Once that inference has been raised, it is the government's failure or inability
to demonstrate that the disparities are not the product of discrimination which
confirms the inference and invalidates the jury pool. United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) (citations omitted).
See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935). However, in recent cases, the government's burden has been made very heavy
indeed, so that it will almost always lose when there is a strong prima facie case of ra-
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racial composition of the jury panel is not expected to mirror exactly
that of the community; it is enough that no one is excluded on account
of race.41
Although the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury could
be invoked in jury discrimination cases from federal courts, cases from
state courts were treated under the equal protection clause until
1968.42 Because most of these cases involved allegations of racial
discrimination and because the fourteenth amendment was most clearly
applicable in such cases, the Court was slow to respond to attacks
on discrimination against other groups in jury selection.48  Neverthe-
less, a concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community has
been gradually emerging. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., Justice
Murphy, speaking for the Supreme Court, explained:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with
either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an im-
partial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does
not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all
the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups
of the community; frequently such complete representation would be
impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.44
cial discrimination based on statistical comparisons. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967); cf. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). The Supreme Court has further
encouraged challenges to the racial composition of the jury pool by holding that white
defendants have standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks, since "the exclusion of a
discernible class from jury service injures not only those defendants who belong to the
excluded class, but other defendants as well, in that it destroys the possibility that the
jury will reflect a representative cross section of the community." Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 500 (1971).
41. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
42. This was the year that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) was de-
cided. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
43. Ultimately, the courts did strike down exclusion of many different groups.
For the historical development of the jury discrimination cases, see Kentucky v. Powers,
139 F. 452 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905) (members of certain political parties); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (women not members of League of Women Voters);
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earners); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (women); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (Mexican-Americans); State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965)
(atheists); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (persons opposed to capital
punishment). But cf. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (exclusion of doctors,
lawyers and other professionals permissible to prevent interruption of their services);
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (approving so-called "blue ribbon" juries for
special cases, despite the fact that certain occupational groups apparently were ex-
cluded); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (approving a scheme whereby women
were not called for jury duty unless they volunteered); Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785
(5th Cir. 1972) (exclusion of women with school-age children permissible).
44. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1945) (citations omitted). Thiel was a tort case filed in
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Because state criminal defendants have enjoyed, since 1968, a federal
constitutional right to trial by jury,45 and because "jury" presumably
means "impartial jury,"' 46 it might be concluded that the cross-section
requirement is now fully applicable to state criminal proceedings.
Three questions arise regarding the nature of such a constitutional
requirement of cross-sectional balance in jury selection. First, is the
exclusion of geographic groups indeed unconstitutional, as suggested
by Justice Murphy? Second, how much deviation from a true racial
cross-section can be tolerated without raising an inference of constitu-
tionally infirm discrimination? And third, what community is it that
the jury must represent?
The answer to the first question has already been suggested:
It has indeed been stated that jurors must be drafted "without systematic
and intentional exclusion" of any "geographical," as well as of any
"social, religious, racial" or "political" group; and that may well forbid
the officials who draw up the lists from excluding any part of the district
at their own choice. We assume that they may not do so; but if they
do not, "geographical" uniformity is satisfied, for the district and cir-
cuit courts have had power since the first Judiciary Act of 1789 to
divide a district territorially in the interests of an impartial trial, of
economy, and of lessening the burden of attendance. There cannot be
the faintest question of the constitutionality of the statute; the courts
have again and again recognized its validity.
4 7
California state court and removed to federal court. Plaintiff challenged the jury
selection procedure on the ground that all wage earners paid on a daily basis were in-
tentionally excluded. In sustaining plaintiff's challenge, the Supreme Court based its
holding on its supervisory powers over the federal courts. The quoted passage is dicta
in relation to state trials, but is nevertheless cited in many of the cases collected in
note 43 supra as the definitive exposition of the cross-section concept for both fed-
eral and state contexts. The Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced cross-sec-
tional representation as an absolute fourteenth amendment standard applicable against
the states. But see note 46 infra and accompanying text.
45. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Prior to Duncan, when federal
courts voided state jury selection procedures, they did so on the ground that impar-
tiality in judicial proceedings was fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty un-
derlying the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See, e.g., Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1967); Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).
46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181-82 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan suggested that any other conclusion would be absurd. See Irvin v. Doud,
366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961). If this analysis is correct, it implies that the Supreme
Court will judge state jury selection procedures against the federal constitutional
standard of an "impartial jury," rather than on a case-by-case "fundamental fairness"
basis; and an "impartial jury" has, in federal cases, meant a jury representative of
the community. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
47. United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1948) (opinion of the
court by Judge Learned Hand) (footnotes omitted).
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The requirement of cross-sectional balance in jury selection is predi-
cated on the sixth amendment's mandate that defendants be afforded
an impartial jury; and since the same Congress that adopted the
sixth amendment authorized geographical exclusion and therefore pre-
sumably did not feel that such a practice contravened impartiality,
there is little historical support for reading the sixth amendment to
prohibit exclusion of geographical groups. Furthermore, while mem-
bers of racial, economic, and sexual groups may possess distinct atti-
tudes, so that their inclusion in jury panels is essential to insure the
representation of all viewpoints, 48 it can hardly be said that residents
of one area necessarily hold different views and attitudes from those
of their neighbors in another.49 Of course, exclusion of a geographic
group can be a subterfuge for racial discrimination if the excluded
area is heavily populated by minority group members; but if a geo-
graphic limitation has an acceptable purpose independent of its racial
effect and is fair and reasonable, then notwithstanding the contrary
language in the Thiel case, it is apparently immune from constitutional
attack. 0
48. For an eloquent discussion of racial and occupational discrimination in jury
selection, see Judge Wisdom's opinion in Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.
1966).
49. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir. 1970). Different areas
may, of course, vary in their racial and economic composition, and these differences
may produce attitudinal variations. If the influences of such social factors are can-
celled out, however, there is no reason to suppose that people will possess different
attitudes solely because they live in different parts of the same city or county. Thus
if a court can eliminate any independent inference of purposeful racial or economic
discrimination (including the possibility mentioned in the text that racial discrimina-
tion may have been effected by the careful drawing of boundaries), and if the jury
panel has sufficient representation from all cultural groups to satisfy the cross-section
requirement, there is no reason why logical geographic limits on the area from
which jurors are drawn should be inherently suspect.
50. Geographic limitations are analogous to other jury service eligibility re-
quirements in that both are designed to effect reasonable state purposes and are facially
neutral with respect to race, yet both may have the effect of excluding disproportion-
ate numbers of minority group members. "Mhe [Supreme] Court has long recog-
nized that fair and reasonable qualifications for jury service eligibility can be imposed
even though they detract from a cross section in the actual jury pools," United States
v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 567 (1st Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted). Contra, Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942): "[Officials charged with choosing federal
jurors] must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections
which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the commun-
ity."
At least one court has suggested that where an otherwise valid eligibility require-
ment disables a disproportionate number of members of a minority group, the state has
an affirmative obligation to seek out more of the qualified group members in com-
pensation, if it is to avoid an inference of discrimination. Labat v. Bennett, 365
F.2d 698, 725 (5th Cir. 1966).
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If there is in reality no geographical branch of the cross-section
test, is it possible that the racial imbalance between the district in
which the crime was committed (31 percent Negro in the Jones case)
and the district from which the jurors were drawn (7 percent in Jones)
could be great enough, standing alone, to invalidate the jury? The
Supreme Court has stated that the jury roll need not be -"a perfect
mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate
strength of every identifiable group." 51  It is enough that every prop-
erly cognizable element of the community has "substantial" represen-
tation.12  Although one court has held that race may properly be con-
sidered in choosing jurors in order to alleviate the effects of past
discrimination,5 3 no court has suggested that ratios or quotas be im-
posed. 4 If the jury selection process is fair and reasonable, significant
deviations from an ideal statistical model of the community are toler-
able if each important sociological group has some representation. In-
deed, it appears that the emphasis has shifted from the actual composi-
tion of the jury to the selection process, and whether that process
presents "a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section
of the community."55
The more interesting question concerns the proper community
to be used as a standard, assuming that constitutional requirements
of geographic or racial representation do exist.56 It seems reasonable,
51. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); see United States v. Di Tom-
maso, 405 F.2d 385, 398 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Arnett, 342 F. Supp. 1255,
1259 (D. Mass. 1970).
52. A cognizable group must have a definite composition, not shifting from day to
day; must have members who share common ideas, attitudes or experiences; and there
must be a possibility that exclusion of members of the group will result in a partiality
or bias in cases in which group members are involved. United States v. Guzman, 337
F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.
1972). For example, "young people" are not a cognizable group. Id. at 145; ci.
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Deardorff, 343
F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a discussion of what constitutes "substantial"
representation, see Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 So. CAL. L. Rlv.
235 (1968).
53. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967), overruling Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 901 (1964). But see Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1949) (dicta):
"An accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the
selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race"
(emphasis added).
54. But cf. Kuhn, supra note 52.
55. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (emphasis added).
56. The courts have never defined just what is meant by a "community." Pre-
sumably, the term is intended to refer to a group of people living in a certain area, and
therefore requires extrinsic definition of the area involved, i.e., what community (area)
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from the standpoint of both history and logic, to begin with the com-
munity in which the crime was committed. If the jurors are drawn
from that community, the cross-section requirement should be satisfied.
However, if jurors are to be selected from another population that
is significantly different-for example, one that is totally devoid of
members of a cognizable group in the community in which the crime
was committed--care must be taken that there is some possibility for
representation of that group on the jury panel. One approach in
such a case would be to redefine the area from which the jurors are
to be selected to include the community in which the crime was com-
mitted. This approach was followed by the Alaska Supreme Court
in Alvarado v. State,5 a case relied on heavily by the California Su-
preme Court in Jones. However, the Alaska court based its result
on a requirement of cross-sectional representation, and not on a con-
stitutional vicinage limitation, as the Jones court suggested in its opin-
ion. 5
The California Supreme Court was clearly troubled in Jones by
implications of the cross-sectional approach which it chose not to artic-
is it that the jury must represent? This may very well be a different answer for
purposes of assuring cross-sectional balance in the jury pool than for purposes of de-
ciding whether a vicinage requirement has been met. The definitional problem is not
considered here, beyond pointing out that, in some cases, the pursuit of cross-sectional
representation may require modification of juror selection district boundaries, and that
Jones is probably not one of those cases.
57. 486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971). Alvarado was a native Alaskan from a small,
isolated village, who was tried by a jury drawn from within a 15 mile radius of
Anchorage, thereby excluding all residents of native villages. The crime was commit-
ted in the village, and the Alaska court therefore held that native villagers were
among the groups that had to be represented in the jury pool. A lower California
court distinguished Alvarado in a similar situation because there was no proof that
residents of the excluded area were significantly different from residents of the area
from which the jury was drawn-whereas there was concededly a vast difference be-
tween villagers and city-dwellers in the Alaska case. People v. McDowell, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (4th Dist. 1972).
It seems safe to say that, had the California Supreme Court chosen to approach
the Jones case under the "cross-section of the community" theory, the result would
have resembled that in McDowell, because of two problems that loom large in trying to
apply the Alvarado reasoning to intra-city variations. First, there are probably some
blacks and some poor people in every region of a city, and the cases have uniformly
held that some representation of these groups is enough, absent purposeful discrimina-
tion. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text. Second, while one mght argue
that suburban blacks have different values and lifestyles than ghetto dwellers and
therefore under the Alvarado rationale cannot fairly represent them in the jury pool,
the spectre of a parade of anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists attempting to
draw parallels between Alaskan villagers and the inner-city poor is likely to prove too
much for most courts. Given the very real problems of judicially administering such
an elusive standard, Alvarado is probably destined to be limited to its unique facts.
58. 9 Cal. 3d at .. , 510 P.2d at 709-10, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
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ulate: in a typical large metropolitan area with segregated housing
patterns, a state could easily build its courthouses in the all-white sub-
urbs, draw all-white juries from the surrounding areas, and use them
to try black defendants from the inner-city ghetto. Such a result
is patently unjust but heretofore would arguably have been constitu-
tional, under the established case law defining the characteristics of
an "impartial" jury and a "cross-section of the community." The
standards developed under these precedents would not prohibit such
action by the state because (1) geographical exclusion, unlike sociolog-
ical exclusion, is not intrinsically invidious,"9 (2) there are some few
blacks in the suburbs, and, beyond that, proportional representation
of minorities in the jury pool is not required,60 and (3) communities
within the same city are not so different that one cannot fairly repre-
sent another.61 Thus the court in Jones undoubtedly felt compelled
to seek an alternative legal tool, and found one in the sixth amendment
vicinage provision. Although historical justification for the court's
interpretation is meager,62 this is not the first time that a court has
twisted the past in order to cope more effectively with the vicissitudes
of the present.
The Jones decision leaves several problems unresolved and may
create a new one. First, nothing in the opinion prohibits the state
legislature from drawing smaller judicial districts, and making their
boundaries coextensive with existing racial housing patterns, producing
all-white juries in one district and all-black juries in another. This
situation is disquieting, but not clearly inconsistent with the common
law concept that a jury should be composed of the accused's peers
(assuming blacks are tried for crimes committed in black areas and
therefore get black juries, and whites are tried for crimes committed
in white areas and therefore get white juries). It is unlikely, however,
that even a racially-motivated legislature would choose such a course,
because although black defendants in predominately white areas would
get fewer blacks on their juries, black defendants in black areas would
59. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
61. This is really a corollary of proposition number two, that there are some
blacks in the suburbs and that, beyond that, proportional representation is not required.
While there is no doubt that communities within the same city are different, the
point is that the differences are not perceived as being of sufficient magnitude to war-
rant judicial intervention in the state jury selection scheme. See note 57 supra.
Defendants challenging their jury panels are unlikely to overcome this obstacle until the
United States Supreme Court reverses its stand on the proportional representation
question. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 21-36 supra and accompanying text.
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get more black jurors. Regardless of the legislature's districting deci-
sions, under Jones the average defendant will be tried by an average
jury which reflects the racial composition of the entire state.08 If a
state should nevertheless decide to gerrymander its districts, as the
Jones court suggests it can, there is a potential conflict between the
Jones court's reading of the vicinage provision and the federal prece-
dents requiring that a jury be representative of a cross-section of the
community. 4  This conflict would materialize if "community" was
judicially defined as a broader area than the legislatively-drawn juror
selection districts. If, for example, the courts determined that jury
panels must reflect a cross-section of the population of the state as
a whole, and at the same time continued to insist that each and every
juror be drawn from the district where the crime was committed,
the legislature's only solution would be to draw one statewide district
and impanel statewide juries. This would hardly promote conveni-
ence or lessen the burden of attendance. Finally, the Jones case may
actually hurt minority defendants accused of committing crimes in
white areas away from their homes.6 5 Unless a state chooses to draw
very large juror selection districts, such defendants will virtually be
assured an all-white jury. Thus, while Jones will curb the most
flagrant abuses (i.e., trying all black defendants in white suburban
areas), the vicinage provision must be regarded as a legal tool of lim-
ited utility.
California must now retry Leon Jones. But more importantly,
no matter how large or small the state may draw its districts in the
future, most minority defendants will stand a better chance of getting
juries that reflect the racial composition of their community."6 Justice
will more nearly be done, albeit at the expense of logic. Given the
growing number of defendants challenging the composition of their
jury panels, and the concomitant need of the courts for analytic tools
with which to attack jury discrimination questions, it seems likely
that People v. Jones will be cited frequently in the future with both
approval and disapproval. Controversy over how to guarantee an im-
partial jury to minority defendants will continue until the courts admit
that, in matters of jury selection, the Constitution cannot be color
blind unless it is color conscious.
63. See note 66 infra.
64. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 3 supra.
66. While individual minority defendants may not be in any better position after
Jones, minority defendants as a class gain significant protection: they cannot all be
tried by white juries from outlying areas of a city. See note 63 supra and accom-
panying text.
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